

The information was compiled by:  
**German Solidarity with Myanmar Democracy e.V.**  
 P.O. Box 842  
 79008 Freiburg  
[www.solidarity-myanmar.de](http://www.solidarity-myanmar.de)



# Political Briefing | The Situation in Myanmar Two Years After The Coup & The Development of Germany’s Myanmar Policy

## Table of Contents


<b>Table of Contents</b>	1
<b>Table of Contents</b>	1
Executive Summary	2
Overview current situation	3
<b>Human Rights Situation</b>	3
<b>Humanitarian Situation</b>	3
<b>Military Conflict</b>	3
<b>Political and geopolitical situation</b>	4
<b>Economic Situation</b>	4
<b>Civil Society</b>	5
<b>Climate Change, Biodiversity &amp; Natural Resources</b>	5
Assessment of Germany’s Myanmar Policy	6
<b>Scorecard Federal Government</b>	6
<b>International Diplomacy</b>	6
<b>Anti-Junta Measures</b>	6
<b>Pro Democratic Opposition Measures</b>	7
<b>Humanitarian and Development Cooperation</b>	7
<b>Refugees, Asylum and Diaspora</b>	7
<b>International Accountability</b>	8
Short Press Briefing	9
Political Demands	10

## Executive Summary

In 2022, Myanmar's junta launched more attacks on civilians than terrorist groups did in Afghanistan; Myanmar has a comparable number of political prisoners to Iran (hundreds of whom have also been sentenced to death), and a humanitarian crisis comparable in scale to the situation in Ukraine. Yet Myanmar remains a blind spot in European and German foreign policy compared to those countries.

It has been over two years since the Myanmar military coup, with tens of thousands of civilians and armed people killed and daily ongoing violence. Millions of people have been displaced or are in need of aid. Humanitarian assistance is dramatically underfunded. The United Nations and human rights organizations accuse the Myanmar junta of crimes against humanity and condemn the elections scheduled for 2023 as a sham. Neighbouring countries are either holding back or positioning themselves on the side of the junta. The country's economy remains severely affected. The international community, while not recognizing the military, has so far provided limited support to the elected government in exile. Despite such limited support, the democratic opposition continues its brave resistance successfully. The junta has lost effective control over large parts of the country.

The Federal Republic of Germany has strongly condemned the military coup and is working internationally for accountability and against impunity. Although the democratic opposition receives symbolic support, the German government also sends conflicting signals and in part indirectly strengthens the junta's legitimacy. There is a lack of concrete support for the democratic opposition, a lack of assistance for Myanmar refugees and a lack of humanitarian commitment that does justice to the deepening crisis in Myanmar.



### Abbreviations

CDM | Civil Disobedience Movement

CRPH | Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw

CSO | civil society organization

EAO | ethnic armed organization

NUG | National Unity Government

PDF | People's Defense Force

SAC | State Administration Council

# Overview current situation

## Human Rights Situation

The brutal crackdown on the resistance to the military coup of 1<sup>st</sup> February 2021 is evident in the reports by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP):<sup>1</sup> 3,026 civilians were killed by the military since the coup. 19,836 civilians have been arrested, of which 15,852 are still detained and sentenced, and 3,833 have been released. These are verified figures, but the number of unreported cases is much higher. Various sources speak of more than 20,000 civilians killed. **Myanmar is a forgotten crisis in international comparison: the number of detainees is almost identical to Iran<sup>2</sup> and in 2022 there were twice as many attacks on civilians in Myanmar than in Afghanistan.**<sup>3</sup>


Current figures speak of 1.5 million displaced people (IDPs) in the country now. This is by far the largest refugee crisis in Southeast Asia. The situation in the conflict zones is catastrophic and international assistance is restricted by the junta in many regions. Rapes, robberies and killings are commonplace. Hundreds of villages continue to be bombed from the air and deliberately burned to the ground to weaken resistance groups. "War crimes and crimes against humanity are committed on a daily basis," says Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar.<sup>4</sup>

## Humanitarian Situation

**The current United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan** estimates that 17.6 million (cf. 2022: 14.4 million) of Myanmar's 56 million inhabitants will need humanitarian aid. It is estimated that almost half of the population will be living in poverty in 2023. The development progress of the past decade has been wiped out by the military coup.

At the same time the coup has had a devastating impact on the educational opportunities of children in Myanmar; having already missed two years of school due to school closures during the pandemic and coup, 3.7 million children remain out of school.<sup>5</sup>

Humanitarian Response Plan 2023, per country



## Military Conflict

After two years of conflict, the junta has stable control over only 17% of the country,<sup>6</sup> especially in the cities of Yangon and Mandalay. Resistance groups control more than 50% of the country's total land area, though this data is difficult to verify.<sup>7</sup> Violent clashes continue to occur; the military is cracking down on the democratic opposition without any regard for civilians, primarily with air strikes (more than

<sup>1</sup> Stand 23.02.2023

<sup>2</sup> UK House of Commons 2023, [Iran protests 2022: Human rights and international response](#)

<sup>3</sup> ACLED, 31.01.2023, <https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2023/myanmar/>

<sup>4</sup> OHCHR, 21.03.2022, [UN expert: Myanmar people betrayed with 'vague declarations' and 'tedious, endless wait' for action](#)

<sup>5</sup> OCHA 2023, [Humanitarian Response Plan Myanmar](#)

<sup>6</sup> Special Advisory Council - Myanmar 2022, [Effective Control in Myanmar](#)

<sup>7</sup> Asia Times, Davis A., [Myanmar Air Force fiercely gunning to win the war](#)

600 since the coup), as ground forces are often outmatched.<sup>8 9</sup> Since the beginning of the fighting, more than 20,000 fighters on both sides have been killed.<sup>10</sup>

Much of the equipment for the military comes from China and Russia,<sup>11</sup> but Israel, Serbia, Pakistan and India are also involved in the arms trade.<sup>12 13 14</sup> Russia continues to supply mainly ammunition and aircraft such as fighter jets despite its own shortages in the Ukraine war.

Although Myanmar has been showing nuclear ambitions for more than 20 years<sup>15 16 17</sup> SAC is actively strengthening its partnership with Russia since the coup, including in relation to nuclear power, resulting in expressions of concern in the US<sup>18</sup>. Some say this partnership could pose a long-term threat to nuclear security.<sup>19</sup>

### Political and geopolitical situation

**Elections:** the junta has already extended the state of emergency more times than the 2008 Myanmar Constitution allows for.<sup>20</sup> The junta plans to hold elections in 2023 to legitimize its own power. The admission of only some political parties has caused democratic factions to be weakened, which adds to the fact that a free election in the war-torn country is impossible.<sup>21</sup>

**Neighbouring countries** such as China, India and Thailand are trying not to lose their influence in the region and are therefore shying away from a clear condemnation of the junta.

Although a no-fly zone is being discussed<sup>22</sup> it is an unrealistic option according to many experts.<sup>23 24</sup>

**Regarding the recognition of the junta,** the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar takes a clear position: "**By any standard, the junta is not a legitimate government and should not be recognized or cooperated with as such.**"<sup>25</sup>

**ASEAN:** the "Five-Point-Consensus" for Myanmar adopted by ASEAN shortly after the coup<sup>26</sup> is now considered as largely failed.<sup>27 28</sup>

### Economic Situation

**The economic situation** is catastrophic due to both the coup and the COVID-19 pandemic. The financial institutions function only partially and the national currency (the Kyat) has suffered a sharp decline in value. Moreover, as many people joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), entire industries are at a standstill. Recurrent fighting, frequent power outages and gasoline shortages have led to gross

---

<sup>8</sup> ISP Myanmar 2023, [Two Years after the Coup - Entrenching the Quagmire](#)

<sup>9</sup> IISS Myanmar Stand 25.02.2023, [Conflict Map](#)

<sup>10</sup> Aclod Data Stand 25.02.2023, [Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project](#)

<sup>11</sup> Finanzen.net 14.02.2023, [Russland liefert trotz Krieg Waffen an Militärjunta in Myanmar](#)

<sup>12</sup> UN 22.02. 2022, [Stop weapons supply to Myanmar, rights expert urges](#)

<sup>13</sup> Burma Campaign 2022, [Burma Briefing - Serbia still arming the Burmese military?](#)

<sup>14</sup> BBC 16.01.2023, [Global firms help Myanmar's military make weapons, says report](#)

<sup>15</sup> Taylor and Francis Online 29.09.2020, [Myanmar's Nuclear Ambitions](#)

<sup>16</sup> Irrawaddy 06.10.2022, [Myanmar Junta's Nuclear Ambition Timeline](#)

<sup>17</sup> Dailymotion 2012, [Myanmar's military ambitions - Part 1 - video](#)

<sup>18</sup> VOA 15.02.2023, [US Worried by Myanmar Junta, Russia Expanding Nuclear Cooperation](#)

<sup>19</sup> Arms Control Association, [Report Alleges Secret Myanmar Nuclear Work](#)

<sup>20</sup> DER SPIEGEL 05.02.2023, [Das Land befindet sich im Bürgerkrieg](#)

<sup>21</sup> CNBC 31.01.2023, [UN expert warns Myanmar's military plans to seek legitimacy in 'sham' election](#)

<sup>22</sup> the federal 1601.2023, [Will US do a Bosnia on Myanmar? No-fly-zone move may involve India](#)

<sup>23</sup> East Asia Forum, 2021, [A no-fly zone won't fly in Myanmar](#)

<sup>24</sup> Mizzima, 24 February 2023, Davis A., [No fly zone over Myanmar 'impossible' due to China's possible reaction](#)

<sup>25</sup> OHCHR 31.01.2023, [Illegal and Illegitimate: Examining the Myanmar military's claim as the Government of Myanmar](#) (..)

<sup>26</sup> ASEAN 24.04.2021, [Chairman -Statement on ALM Five Point Consensus](#)

<sup>27</sup> Human rights watch 22.04.2022, [Myanmar: ASEAN's Failed '5-Point Consensus' a Year On](#)

<sup>28</sup> Aseanmp.org 2022, ["Time is not on our side":](#)

domestic product per capita being still 13% below pre-pandemic levels. Nevertheless, the World Bank forecasts economic growth of 3% in 2023 for Myanmar.<sup>29</sup>

**Tourism:** while tourism was a hopeful sector from 2012-2020, with about one million international arrivals per year<sup>30</sup>, Myanmar closed the country in 2020 for two years due to COVID-19. The opening of Myanmar to international tourism in April 2022 had little success. Most governments strongly advise against travel due to the precarious security situation. Since April 2021, the German Foreign Office urges all German nationals to leave the country immediately.<sup>31</sup> They further point out that foreign visitors must expect to be monitored. Military checkpoints are on many streets, and restaurants, hotels and stores whose owners are said to be close to the military rulers are considered to be at risk.

### Civil Society

Due to the suppression of public protests after the coup, civil society activism now takes place mainly underground within Myanmar. Many local NGOs have moved their work to the Thai-Myanmar border, or elsewhere.<sup>32</sup> Yet there are many signs of Myanmar's vibrant civil society:

**Lawyers** are putting their careers on the line to represent political prisoners.

**Doctors** are setting up new clinics to fill gaps in care after the collapse of the state health system.

**Striking teachers** set up alternative schools.<sup>33</sup>

Analysts therefore call for Myanmar civil society to be **seen as a partner in humanitarian assistance** that must be supported.<sup>34 35</sup>

**PDFs:** Many people are joining the "People's Defence Forces," militias that join ethnic armed organizations in militantly opposing the military.

**Trade unions:** Immediately after the coup, all existing trade unions were declared illegal organizations, arrest warrants were issued against large sections of their leadership, and many were arrested.

### Climate Change, Biodiversity & Natural Resources

Myanmar is regarded as one of the 'most affected and least prepared' for climate change in the world. It is also among the top 10 irreplaceable hotspots for biodiversity worldwide.<sup>36</sup>

Since the military coup, deforestation is increasing rapidly again (with \$190 million in timber exports in 2021<sup>37</sup>) and mining practices with hazardous effects on the environment (e.g. rare earth mining<sup>38</sup>) are increasing - often under the direct control of the Myanmar junta and primarily for the benefit of Chinese investors.

---

<sup>29</sup> Weltbank 30.01.2023, [Uncertainty weighs on Myanmar's economy](#)

<sup>30</sup> The Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business 2015, [Executive Summary and Recommendations: Myanmar Tourism \(..\)](#)

<sup>31</sup> Auswärtiges Amt Stand 25.02.2023, [Myanmar: Reise- und Sicherheitshinweise](#)

<sup>32</sup> New Mandala 2022, [Effective third-sector actors in aid on the Thailand-Myanmar border](#)

<sup>33</sup> OHCHR 31.01.2023, [Illegal and Illegitimate: Examining the Myanmar military's claim as the Government of Myanmar and \(..\)](#)

<sup>34</sup> Marciel 2022, [It's Time to Help Myanmar's Resistance Prevail](#)


<sup>35</sup> Transnational Institute 2022, [The Time for Change in International Aid: The Importance of Civil Society](#)

<sup>36</sup> IDEA 2022, *Myanmar's Environment and Climate Change Challenges*

<sup>37</sup> Forest Trends 2022, *Despite sanctions on Myanmar, the US, UK, and EU imported more than \$36 million in timber since (..)*

<sup>38</sup> Global Witness 2022, *Heavy Rare Earths Supply Chain Risks*

# Assessment of Germany's Myanmar Policy



## Scorecard Federal Government

German engagement with Myanmar in the two years following the military coup can be divided into six dimensions: (1) International Diplomacy, (2) Measures against the Junta, (3) Measures for the Democratic Opposition, (4) Humanitarian Assistance, (5) Asylum, Refugees & Diaspora, and (6) International Accountability. With such an assessment a nuanced but also highly mixed picture of German Myanmar policy emerges, with concrete options for action that should be prioritized in 2023.

## International Diplomacy

**United Nations:** Germany voted in favour of UN resolution of 18<sup>th</sup> June 2021, calling for an end to the military coup and brutal crackdown on protests.<sup>39</sup> The Permanent Mission to the United Nations also lobbied for Myanmar's current UN ambassador, Kyaw Moe Tun, to continue in his role as a supporter of the National Unity Government.

**ASEAN:** The five-point plan of ASEAN (supported by the German government) includes calls for a ceasefire, negotiations and humanitarian aid. However, so far this exists only on paper.<sup>40</sup> The reference to ASEAN's central role in resolving the Myanmar crisis is therefore far from sufficient. New formats, such as a 'Friends of Myanmar' group of countries, should therefore be given greater focus in 2023.

Rating Federal Government: 2/5

## Anti-Junta Measures

**Sanctions:** Germany supports the six packages of sanctions adopted by the European Council against individuals, companies and institutions.<sup>41</sup> Since members of the military junta and their supporters in most cases have no assets within the European Union, the effect of these sanctions is mainly symbolic. Bilateral and multilateral initiatives to extend the sanctions regime to countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore could have a greater real impact on the junta. Overall, the use of targeted sanctions (rather than blanket sanctions that would affect the population as a whole) is positively highlighted by most observers.<sup>42</sup>

**A parlamentar question by Die Linke** was tabled in the German Bundestag on the subject of "Military technology deliveries to Myanmar". It refers to so-called "dual use" goods that were delivered to Myanmar by German companies despite sanctions and even before the coup. The question was inadequately answered (spelling matter 20/5088) and further targeted research and inquiries should be made in order to clarify possible sanction violations from the past and thus prevent them in the future.

**Legitimacy:** The de facto expulsion of Myanmar's military attaché in Berlin in February 2022 should be highlighted as a blow to the legitimacy of the SAC regime.<sup>43</sup> Since then, however, Germany has also been involved in incidents that have benefited the legitimacy of the junta. In November 2022, it became public that the participation of junta representatives in ASEAN workshops was financed by the German Foreign Office through the Max Planck Institute.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, in February 2023 the Myanmar Chargé

<sup>39</sup> UNGA 2021, [The situation in Myanmar : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly](#)

<sup>40</sup> ASEAN 2022, [Asean Leaders' Review and Decision on the Implementation of the Five-Point Consensus](#)

<sup>41</sup> Europäischer Rat 2023, [Myanmar/Birma: Sechste Sanktionsrunde der EU gegen 9 Personen und 7 Organisationen](#)

<sup>42</sup> International Crisis Group 2023, [Myanmar: Post-Coup Crisis and a Flawed Election](#)

<sup>43</sup> GSwMD e.V. 24.02.2022, [Ein starkes Signal für die Demokratie – in Deutschland und Myanmar!](#)

<sup>44</sup> GSwMD e.V. 27.11.2022, [Finanziert das Auswärtige Amt über die Max-Planck-Stiftung ein Trainingsprogramm](#) (..)

d'Affaires was received by the ASEAN Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag as part of the Berlin ASEAN Committee.<sup>45</sup> In the course of 2023, the junta will attempt to legitimize itself on the international stage through a sham election. It is essential that Germany takes a clear position and does not recognize the 'election'.

Rating Federal Government: 3/5

### Pro Democratic Opposition Measures

**Recognition of National Unity Government (NUG):** The German government maintains dialogue with the NUG (e.g. three video conferences between Minister of State Tobias Lindner and NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung). To date, however, Germany does not officially recognize the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar and does not conduct cabinet-level exchanges. Parliamentary contacts with the CRPH have also been limited. The US,<sup>46</sup> Australia,<sup>47</sup> and the Czech Republic<sup>48</sup> have authorized and supported the opening of NUG representative offices in their respective countries.

**Non-Lethal Support:** Unlike in the provisions of the Burma Act in the United States, the German federal government has not yet allowed for "technical and non-lethal support" - such as radar and communications equipment, protective gear, and medical supplies - to NUG, EAOs, or other democratic institutions.<sup>49</sup>

**Government Services:** In cooperation with EAOs and the CDM, the NUG already provides basic health care and education services as well as local administration, either directly in regions such as Magway and Sagaing or indirectly through allied EAOs in border regions.<sup>50</sup> The German government should financially support these services to strengthen democratic institutions and reach more people in Myanmar with effective aid.

**Political Institutions:** Some institutions from Germany support the democracy movement with political education and capacity building. Additional funding and the involvement of broad expertise from German civil society could make an even more effective contribution. All groups within the democracy movement express the need for broader access to appropriate educational opportunities.

Rating Federal Government: 2/5

### Humanitarian and Development Cooperation

**Humanitarian Assistance:** The UN estimates that 17.6 million people, which is about one-third of the country's population, will be in need of humanitarian assistance this year. This figure is almost identical to the proportion of the population in Ukraine that is in need of similar assistance. Yet only 41% of the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan for Myanmar was funded by international donors. Germany contributed only 7% to this effort at \$23.5 million - far behind the US, Japan, the EU, and the UK.<sup>51</sup> In addition to increased funding, direct collaboration with CSOs, EAOs, and NUG is essential.

Rating Federal Government: 2/5

### Refugees, Asylum and Diaspora

**Political Asylum:** Although no official data is available, information from the Myanmar community paints a sobering picture of the German government's efforts to grant refuge to political activists from Myanmar in Germany. Less than a dozen activists and artists have been able to come to Germany since the coup, while for example France has taken in and supported a contingent of 30 exiled artists.

---

<sup>45</sup> GSwMD e.V. 13.02.2023, [Offener Brief: Treffen mit dem Berlin ASEAN Committee](#)

<sup>46</sup> The Diplomat 16.02.2023, [Myanmar's National Unity Government Opens Office in Washington](#)

<sup>47</sup> ABC News 28.07.2022, [Australian officials set to attend opening of Myanmar 'representative office' in Canberra for\(..\)](#)

<sup>48</sup> Mizzima Myanmar News and Insight 29.10.2021, [NUG Representative Office opened in the Czech Republic](#)

<sup>49</sup> CSIS 2023, [What the BURMA Act Does and Doesn't Mean for U.S. Policy in Myanmar](#)

<sup>50</sup> The Diplomat (Annawitt) 2022, [Is Myanmar's National Unity Government Ready to Govern?](#)

<sup>51</sup> OCHA 2023, [Humanitarian Response Plan Myanmar](#)

**Resettlement:** Since the coup, more than 20,000 Myanmar refugees have arrived in Thailand. They have limited access to education and health services, and resettlement to third countries has been slow.<sup>52</sup> Under the UNHCR Resettlement Program, only 13 Myanmar refugees have been admitted to the EU since 2021, and none of them in Germany - compared to 2,486 who found refuge in the US in 2022 alone.<sup>53</sup> The German government should also improve conditions for Myanmar refugees in Thailand and ensure that larger contingents can leave for Germany through the resettlement program.

**Passport renewal:** The renewal of passports at military-controlled embassies causes problems for Myanmar nationals worldwide.<sup>54</sup> This is also the case in Germany. In recent months, extensions have been denied in some cases and in other cases passports have been withheld. This puts politically persecuted refugees in particularly precarious situations. There have also been reports that cell phone and social media accounts are being checked when visiting Myanmar embassies worldwide.<sup>55</sup>

Rating federal government: 1/5

### International Accountability

**Fortify Rights**, a US-based human rights organization, filed a complaint against the junta with the German prosecutor's office in January 2023 under the principle of Universal Jurisdiction. The primary purpose is to gather evidence to be submitted to international bodies such as the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM). Two Myanmar political refugees living in Germany are involved in the lawsuit.<sup>56</sup>

**International Court of Justice:** In 2022, Germany agreed to support the proceedings initiated by The Gambia before the International Court of Justice on the genocide of the Rohingya. "Therefore, Germany will intervene in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice."<sup>57</sup>

Further judicial complaints regarding possible sanctions violations are in preparation and cannot be further named at this time in order to protect the involved parties.

**The German government's summoning of the Myanmar Chargé d'Affaires**<sup>58</sup> in Berlin in 2022 after death sentences were carried out against four activists, among them Ko Jimmy and former parliamentarian Zeyar Thaw, was a respectable and important step.<sup>59</sup>

Rating federal government: 4/5

---

<sup>52</sup> Voice of America 2023, [Despite Talks, Reassurances, Myanmar Refugees Remain in Limbo](#)

<sup>53</sup> UNHCR Stand 25.02.2023, [Resettlement Data Finder](#)

<sup>54</sup> Frontier Myanmar 26.01.2023, [Thousands face a nervous wait as junta freezes passport renewals](#)

<sup>55</sup> Dies Informationen stammen aus internen Gesprächen und Kontakten und können zum aktuellen Zeitpunkt aufgrund der Sicherheitslage nicht nachgewiesen werden

<sup>56</sup> DER SPIEGEL 31.01.2023, [Myanmar zwei Jahre nach Putsch: »Das Militär verhaftet, foltert, tötet«](#)

<sup>57</sup> AA 25.08.2022, [Federal Foreign Office on the fifth anniversary of the attacks against Rohingya communities in\(..\)](#)

<sup>58</sup> Irrawaddy 29.07.2022, [Germany Summons Myanmar Diplomat Over Executions](#)

<sup>59</sup> DER SPIEGEL 25.07.2022, [Hinrichtung von Ko Jimmy in Myanmar: Mord an einem Hoffnungsträger - DER SPIEGEL](#)



---

## Short Press Briefing

DER SPIEGEL, Reporting on the daily life of resistance fighters

[Bericht auf dem Alltag von Widerstandskämpfer\\*innen](#)

GSwMD e.V, Weekly updates including summaries of international media reports

[Wöchentliches Update mit Zusammenfassung ausländischer Medien](#)

Stern, Report on the new round of EU sanctions

[Bericht über neue EU Sanktionsrunde](#)

Crisisgroup, [Breaking Gender and Age Barriers amid Myanmar's Spring Revolution](#)

Russia continues its weapons supplies to Myanmar:

[Finanzen.net](#)

[ORE](#)

[The Diplomat](#)

AP News, [Report on how Myanmar and Russia sign pact on developing nuclear power](#)

## Political Demands

- To engage, cooperate with and fund the NUG, CRPH, NUCC, ethnic states' consultative councils and other political representative bodies of the EROs to enable them to build their capacity. The broad alliance that stands behind the Federal Democratic Charter is the only grouping in Myanmar that, with support, can end both the current conflict and the decades of civil war. This must be a key policy goal for the EU.
- We welcome recent higher level public meetings between the EU and EU Member States representatives and NUG representatives. However, in order to send a strong message to the Myanmar military and to send a strong message of solidarity to the people of Myanmar, such meetings should now take place at Prime Ministerial and Presidential level.
- Fund the NUG's and EROs' public services. They have proven to be committed to providing services – health care, education, judiciary and more – that the military is intentionally denying and destroying. Significant EU funding will help consolidate these critically important services and go a long way to prevent an otherwise rapidly deepening state collapse.
- Fund the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) because it is another pillar on which the revival of essential public services can and should be built. The junta is chasing, arresting, harassing and torturing, imprisoning and killing members of the CDM, who are essential professionals needed for the reconstruction of the public sector.
- Convene an emergency meeting of all Member States that support human rights in Myanmar, as suggested by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, to launch a focused, coordinated, and strategic initiative to deprive the military of the weapons, finances, and legitimacy it utilizes to sustain its campaign of violence and the suppression of the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar.
- Fund humanitarian aid through cross-border mechanisms and local humanitarian and community-based organisations and remove stifling bureaucratic requirements that overburden local CSOs. Current over-reliance on the multi-lateral funding mechanisms administered through UNOPS and INGOs is failing to reach the most vulnerable segments of the population in the most urgent need. By massively scaling up aid to and through non-registered civil society organisations and cross border mechanisms, the EU will be able to reach millions of the most in need in the country.
- Deny legitimacy; make sure that the representatives of the illegal regime are not invited to official events funded or organized by EU and European states' bodies (e.g. International Peace and the Rule of Law project funded by the German Federal Foreign Office).
- Send a clear message refuting the junta's electoral deception; engage other partners, particularly in ASEAN, not to endorse or support the sham elections. The "electoral performance" will not fulfil the definition of a free and fair election since the representatives of political parties opposing the regime are being imprisoned, persecuted, exiled or killed. At the same time, any support for the elections is a violation of the 'do no harm' imperative since there has already been an increase in violence across the country to resist voter registration.
- Support efforts in the UN Security Council to refer the Myanmar situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), or establish an independent Ad-hoc Tribunal on Myanmar.

- Call on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to accept the declaration lodged by the NUG, under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, accepting the Court's jurisdiction with respect to international crimes committed within Myanmar territory.
- Continue to support the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case of Gambia against Myanmar in order to achieve full accountability for the crime of genocide against the Rohingya.
- EU and Member States must do all they can to sanction aviation fuel. Indiscriminate air attacks by helicopters and jets on the civilian population has resulted in thousands of deaths, countless more made homeless and has created a human rights and humanitarian crisis.
- Increase the monitoring and enforcement of existing sanctions. Continue the existing policy of regular new rounds of sanctions targeting sources of revenue and arms to the Myanmar military but significantly increase the pace of implementation. New sanction targets should be identified in cooperation with US and UK partners, and seek to persuade Australia, South Korea, Singapore and Japan to join the EU in new sanctions rounds.
- Sanction Russian, Chinese, Indian and Pakistani companies supplying the Myanmar military with arms and begin high level dialogue with India and Pakistan to persuade them to stop supplying arms to the Myanmar military.
- Introduce programs to assist democracy activists, journalists, and CSO actors who are persecuted by the junta and have fled to neighbouring countries where they have no safety. Such programs, including simplified visa granting, relocations and humanitarian help should be thoroughly aimed, selective, coordinated and flexible.
- EU and its Member States urgently need to prepare a coordinated policy on how to provide, in case of necessity, protection to Myanmar passport holders who are currently in the territory of the EU. There are signs that military embassies may soon deny Myanmar citizens abroad, who are only permitted two-year passports, the possibility of renewing their passports. This will pressure citizens of Myanmar into an involuntary and risky return to the country.
- Open a channel of communication and consult with Myanmar diaspora organizations based in Europe and European solidarity organizations, such as the ones undersigned in this letter<sup>60</sup>.

---

<sup>60</sup> German Solidarity with Myanmar Democracy eV, [European Call for Reinforcement of Myanmar Pro-Democratic Development](#)